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BOOK REVIEWS
Kymlicka, Will, and Norman, Wayne, eds. Citizenship in Diverse Societies.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xii444. $65.00 (cloth); $24.95
(paper).
This thoughtfully designed volume has not only a theme but a point of view
and an argument. The theme is the intersection of contemporary citizenship
theory and the theory of minority rights, each suggesting challenges and pos-
sibilities for the other. While it is philosophically respectable to treat these issues
on a purely conceptual level, editors Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman adopt
a different stance. They suggest that questions about potential conflicts between
virtues and practices of democratic citizenship and diversity “cannot be evaluated
in the abstract, as if all forms of minority rights have the same impact on citi-
zenship. . . . These potential conflicts must be addressed through careful ex-
amination of specific contexts” (p. 17). Accordingly, they invited the contributors
to take up specific policy debates in examining citizenship in diverse societies,
and most of them do so. The editors begin with a substantial analytical intro-
duction that draws on the essays instead of summarizing them and helpfully
provides typologies of diverse kinds of ethnocultural groups (pp. 18–24), of
different paths to resolving conflict (pp. 12–18), and of multiple legal, social,
and political strategies for acknowledging and respecting cultural or religious
distinctiveness (pp. 25–30). The editors arrive at a conclusion of some impor-
tance: “It is impossible . . . to make any sweeping generalizations for or against
the impact of minority rights on citizenship” (p. 40). The questions, they urge,
“must be examined empirically, in specific contexts, rather than prejudged on
the basis of a priori speculation and anecdotal evidence” (p. 40).
The volume itself, however, is the fuller argument for a robust contex-
tualism in normative political theory and political ethics. This contextualism
might be unsatisfying, if not unsettling, to some philosophers. The contributors
are not philosophers for the most part; law and political theory are well rep-
resented, alongside education and social theory. The contextualism in many
of these essays goes beyond paying attention to matters of fact in particular
cases when applying general principles. Instead, this contextualism repeatedly
puts strong generalizations, especially normative principles, in question. Often
these essays treat normative principles as points of departure for an open-
ended look at alternative policies that represent different trade-offs among
competing considerations—evaluative, political, and practical.
Eamonn Callan and Jeff Spinner-Halev lead off in this vein with essays on
public funding for religious schools. Callan argues from respect for individuals,
rather than group identity, for a mixed policy emphasizing public support for
religious education in early years, shifting to common schools in later ones.
Spinner-Halev opposes public funding but supports varied strategies of inclusion
and accommodation that “entice” parents of moderate religious views to make
some use of public schools (p. 70). Jane Mansbridge argues for “descriptive”
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representation of historically subordinate groups (representation of groups by
those similar to the population represented in socially salient respects) in order
to strengthen substantive representation in situations involving “communicative
distrust and uncrystallized issues” (p. 101). Melissa Williams claims that “ideal”
deliberative democracy theory fails to reckon with the weight of social privilege
and unequal power in determining judgments about the “reasonableness” of
some people’s arguments (p. 137). Illinois Senator Carol Moseley-Braun’s gal-
vanizing speech on the U.S. Senate floor against renewal of a design patent for
a private organization’s emblem displaying the Confederate flag appears as an
example in Mansbridge’s discussion of “uncrystallized” or emergent issues where
descriptive representation can make a difference (pp. 117–19).Williams attaches
a summary of the same Senate debate as an appendix to her paper, using the
example to illustrate struggles over the “social meaning of existing practices”
that she argues must become issues for deliberative theories of democracy (pp.
137–41). While Mansbridge and Williams explore negotiations of social meaning
and identity, Jeremy Waldron deplores treating identity claims as “essentially
non-negotiable” (p. 158), conflating respect for individuals of a cultural group
with acceptance of group members’ culturally inflected opinions. Waldron’s
essay does not refer to an actual instance or policy, but the following essay by
Tariq Modood indicates how diverse identities and claims for them can be.
Modood mines a 1994 British survey of ethnic minorities that highlights
diverse constructions of minority and immigrant identities but also the important
and theoretically neglected role of religion in many of them. He supports public
recognition and even corporate representation of religious constituencies in the
political sphere. Ayelet Shachar focuses specifically on consequences for women
of preserving nonliberal minority ethnic and religious cultures; she provides a
“joint governance model” in areas of family law that divides control between
state and religious authorities over different aspects of the same disputes (p.
217). Sawitri Saharso’s essay sits uneasily among these analyses, most of them
detailed and situated, as she appeals to psychoanalytic ideas to affirm sweeping
generalizations about structures of “Western” and “Asian” personalities in order
to distinguish an “intrapsychic” from an “interpersonal” rendition of autonomy
(pp. 235–36).
Denise Re´aume and Pierre Coulombe each examine implications of dif-
ferent rationales for language rights in the context of official Canadian bilin-
gualism. Re´aume sharply criticizes instrumental and political interpretations of
language rights, claiming they are inadequate to the intrinsic value of mother
tongues to their speakers, while Coulombe contrasts liberal universalist, histor-
ical, and deliberative justifications for language rights, finding the last one “more
congenial” to an ideal of democratic citizenship (p. 290). Jacob Levy’s superbly
nuanced exploration of three ways of incorporating indigenous law within or
alongside the civil and criminal codes of liberal society is set in striking juxta-
position (but not opposition) to John Borrows’s visionary and controversial
argument for an inclusive and non-descent-based picture of aboriginal citizen-
ship in the Canadian context based on “rigorous citizenship requirements” (p.
332). Two concluding essays, by Graham Smith on post-Soviet Russian politics
and Rainer Baubo¨ck on justifying secession, ponder possibilities for forming
federations and rationales for sustaining them.
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These essays form provocative colloquies of contrasting or complementary
views on questions of citizenship and diversity across a wide range of issues:
education, representation, law, land, language policy, women, religious and eth-
nic minorities and majorities, indigenous peoples, federalism, and nationalism.
I found the editors’ strong contextualist message illustrated forcefully by most
of these essays, while the individual arguments vary in persuasiveness. The very
topicality required of these essays often results in a somewhat summary presen-
tation or simple invocation of normative frameworks, rather than in a dialectical
development of the normative ideas. In this regard, Callan, Spinner-Halev,Mans-
bridge, Williams, Levy, and Borrows are stronger than some others; they seriously
entertain alternative normative viewpoints as a technique for unfolding their
own. Yet the overall dialogical format makes this book stimulating to study as
well as to read, and it could serve well in advanced courses in democracy, citi-
zenship, multiculturalism, or minority rights. The editors helpfully append a
topically arranged bibliography of additional readings that have appeared since
1994.
A revealing and potentially productive tension runs through most of these
essays as they grapple with the shifting interplay of principled considerations
and the realities of history, power, and political possibility.MelissaWilliams comes
closest to articulating this tension explicitly, as she challenges the adequacy of
“ideal” theories that assume “a sharp disjuncture between a politics of interest
and a politics of deliberation” instead of a “continuum between perfect solidarity
and the unbridled battle of interests” (p. 144). Or, as one might also put it, it
may not be possible to maintain a sharp disjuncture between the conditions and
determinants of moral relations and the realities of political and social ones.
For example, the distinction between a policy or form of society embodying
a “mere” modus vivendi, on the one hand, and a “moral” commitment, on the
other, is invoked at several points by editors and contributors (see Kymlicka and
Norman [p. 35], Callan [p. 46], and Coulombe [pp. 289–90] for explicit ref-
erences, but also see Re´aume [p. 259] and Baubo¨ck [p. 394] invoking the same
distinction in other words). Yet these essays repeatedly make the point that no
principled moral commitment can order social and political relations except
through varied adjustments, exceptions, accommodations, compromises, and
flat trade-offs. Conversely, when the editors speak of politics being “reduced to
a mere modus vivendi amongst groups that barely tolerate, let alone cooperate,
with each other” rather than “the sort of mutual understanding, deliberation,
trust, and solidarity required by a flourishing democracy” (p. 35), they fail to
mark the degree to which some fairly hardy forms of mutual understanding,
deliberation, and trust, at least, are also necessities for even a fragile or touchy
modus vivendi worthy of the name. Is there a threshold at which certain types
or fields of trust, shared terms, and understanding emerge as qualitatively dif-
ferent in kind from mere modes of living? Or are there instead, wherever people
are not dealing with each other routinely through violence, more or less fully
realized, or simply differently realized, forms of moral relations that require
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detailed and comparative justification and criticism? I believe the latter, but the
essays in this collection are rich in materials for testing alternative answers.
Margaret Urban Walker
Arizona State University
